Abstract. Stream cipher ZUC is the core component in the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms 128-EEA3 and 128-EIA3. In this paper, we present the details of our differential attacks against ZUC 1.4. The vulnerability in ZUC 1.4 is due to the non-injective property in the initialization, which results in the difference in the initialization vector being cancelled. In the first attack, difference is injected into the first byte of the initialization vector, and one out of 2 15.4 random keys result in two identical keystreams after testing 2 13.3 IV pairs for each key. The identical keystreams pose a serious threat to the use of ZUC 1.4 in applications since it is similar to reusing a key in one-time pad. Once identical keystreams are detected, the key can be recovered with average complexity 2 99.4 . In the second attack, difference is injected into the second byte of the initialization vector, and every key can result in two identical keystreams with about 2 54 IVs. Once identical keystreams are detected, the key can be recovered with complexity 2 67 . We have presented a method to fix the flaw by updating the LFSR in an injective way in the initialization. Our suggested method is used in the later versions of ZUC. The latest ZUC 1.6 is secure against our attacks.
Introduction
Comparing to block ciphers, dedicated stream ciphers normally require less computation for achieving the same security level. Stream ciphers are widely used in applications. For example, RC4 [10] is used in SSL and WEP, and A5/1 [8] is used in GSM (the Global System for Mobile Communications). But the use of RC4 in WEP is insecure [7] , and A5/1 is very weak [4] . ECRYPT (2004 ECRYPT ( -2008 has organised the eSTREAM competition, which stimulated the study on stream ciphers, and a number of new stream ciphers were proposed [1-3, 5, 6, 9, 15] .
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) was set up for making globally applicable 3G mobile phone system specifications based on the GSM specifications. Stream cipher ZUC was designed by the Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. It is the core component of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms 128-EEA3 & 128-EIA3 which were proposed for inclusion in the "4G" mobile standard LTE (Long Term Evolution). In July 2010, the ZUC 1.4 [11] was made public for evaluation. We developed two key recovery attacks against ZUC 1.4 [16] , and our attacks directly led to the tweak of ZUC 1.4 into ZUC 1.5 [12] in Jan 2011. (Note that it was reported independently in [14] that the non-injective initialization of ZUC 1.4 may result in identical keystreams.) The latest version, ZUC 1.6 [13] , was released in June 2011 (ZUC 1.6 and ZUC 1.5 have almost the same specifications).
In this paper, we present the details of our differential attacks against ZUC 1.4. Our attacks against ZUC is similar to the differential attacks against Py, Py6 and Pypy [17] , in which different IVs result in identical keystreams. In the first attack against ZUC 1.4, the difference is at the first byte of the IV, and one in 2 15.4 keys results in identical keystreams after testing 2 13.3 IV pairs for each key. Once identical keystreams are detected, the key can be recovered with complexity 2 99. 4 . In the second attack against ZUC 1.4, the difference is at the second byte of the IV, and identical keystreams can be obtained after testing 2 54 IVs. The key can be recovered with complexity 2 67 . This paper is organized as follows. The notations and the description of ZUC 1.4 are give in Sect. 2. The overview of the attack is is given in Sect. 3. In Section 4 and 5, we present the key recovery attack with difference at the first byte and the second byte of IV, respectively. We suggest the tweak to fix the flaw in Sect. 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

The Notations
In this paper, we follow the notations used in the ZUC specifications [11] .
+
The addition of two integers ZUC is a word-oriented stream cipher with 128-bit secret key and a 128-bit initial vector. It consists of three main components: the linear feedback shift register (LFSR), the bit-reorganization (BR) and a nonlinear function F . The general structure of the algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 1 . [11] . The output of function F is a 32-bit word W . The keystream word Z is given as Z = W ⊕ X 3 .
The initialization of ZUC 1.4
The initialization of ZUC 1.4 consists of two steps: loading the key and IV into the register, and running the cipher for 32 steps with the keystream word being used to update the state.
Key and IV loading. Denote the 16 key bytes as k i (0 ≤ i ≤ 15), the 16 IV bytes as iv i (0 ≤ i ≤ 15). We load the key and IV into the register as:
. The values of the constants d i are given in [11] . The two memory words R 1 and R 2 in function F are set as 0.
Running the cipher for 32 steps. At the initialization stage, the keystream word Z is used to update the LFSR as follows:
LFSRWithInitialisationMode(u): The cipher runs for 32 steps at the initialization stage as follows:
}
Overview of the Attacks
We notice that the LFSR in ZUC is defined over GF (2 31 −1), with the element 0 being replaced with 2 31 −1. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that GF (2 31 −1) is used in the design of stream cipher. In the initialization of ZUC 1.4, we notice that XOR is involved in the update of LFSR (s 16 
When XOR is applied to the elements in GF (2 31 −1) , we obtain the following undesirable property:
The above property shows that the difference between a and a ′ can get eliminated with an XOR operation! In the rest of this paper, we exploit this property to attack ZUC 1.4 by eliminating the difference in the state.
In our attacks, we try to eliminate the difference in the state without the difference in the state being injected into the nonlinear function F . The reason is that if a difference is injected into F , then Sboxes would be involved, and the difference would remain in F until additional difference being injected into F , thus the probability that the difference in the state being eliminated would get significantly reduced.
We now investigate what are the IV differences that would result in the difference in the state being eliminated with high probability. The IV differences are classified into the following three types:
After loading this type of IVs into LFSR, the difference would appear at the least significant byte of at least one of the LFSR elements s 7 , s 8 , · · · , s 15 . Note that the least significant byte of s 7 is part of X 2 in the Bit-reorganization function since X 2 = s 7L ||s 5H , and X 2 is an input to function F . Due to the shift of LFSR, the difference at the least significant byte of s 7 , s 8 , · · · , s 15 would be injected into F . Thus we would not use this type of IV difference in our attacks. Type 2. ∆iv i = 0 for 7 ≤ i ≤ 15, ∆iv i ̸ = 0 for at least one value of i (2 ≤ i ≤ 6). After loading this type of IVs into LFSR, the difference would appear at the least significant byte of at least one of the LFSR elements s 2 , s 3 , · · · , s 6 . Note that the least significant byte of s 2 is part of X 3 in the Bit-reorganization function since X 3 = s 2L ||s 0H , X 3 is XORed with the output of F to generate keystream word Z, and Z is used to update the LFSR. Two steps later, the difference in iv 2 would appear in the feedback function to update LFSR. It means that if there is difference in iv 2 , the difference in s 2 would be used to update the LFSR twice, and the probability that the difference would be eliminated is very small. Due to the shift of LFSR, the difference at s 2 , s 3 , · · · , s 7 would be eliminated with very small probability. Thus we did not use this type of IV difference in our attacks.
The focus of our attacks is on this type of IV differences. In order to increase the chance of success, we consider the difference at only one byte of the IV. We discuss below how the difference in the state can be eliminated when there is difference in s 0 (the analysis for the difference in s 1 is similar). At the first step in the initialization, 
Suppose that the difference is only at iv 0 , and iv 0 − iv
If we need to eliminate the difference in s 16 , from Property 1 and (3), the following condition should be satisfied:
According to (5) [17. .31]), while according to (4), the subtraction difference of those bits are 0. The only possible reason is that the 15 bits, v [17..31] , are all affected by the carries from the addition of ∆iv 0 to v ′ . After testing all the one-byte differences, we found that v must be in one of the following four forms (the values of v and v ′ can be swapped):
(y is a 7-bit integer.)
There are 510 possible values of v (v = 1 31 and v = 0 31 are excluded since one of v andv cannot be 0). All the (v, v ′ ) pairs and their differences are given in Table 1 
We highlight the following property in the table: the difference between v and v ′ uniquely determines the value of pair (v, v ′ ) in the table. As a result, if we know the difference of IVs that results in the collision of the state, we can determine the value of (v, v ′ ) immediately. By eliminating the difference in the state as illustrated above, we developed two attacks against ZUC 1.4. The first attack is to exploit the difference at iv 0 , and the second attack is to exploit the difference at iv 1 . The details are given in the following two sections.
Attack ZUC 1.with Difference at iv 0
In this section, we present our first differential attack on the initialization by using IV difference at iv 0 and generating identical keystream. The keys that generate the same keystream are called weak keys in this attack. We will show that a weak key exists with probability 2 −15.4 , and a weak key can be detected with about 2 13.3 chosen IVs. Once a weak key is detected, its effective key size is reduced from 128 bits to around 100 bits. 0 We will show that when there is difference at iv 0 , about one in 2 15.4 keys would result in identical keystream. For a random key, we will check whether there exists a pair of IVs such that (5), (6) and (7) can be satisfied.
The weak keys for ∆iv
We start with analyzing how keys and IVs are involved in the expression of u and v in the first step of initialization. From the specifications of the initialization, we have
In (2) and (8), there are 5 bytes of key, {k 0 , k 4 , k 10 , k 13 , k 15 }, and 7 bytes of IV, {iv 0 , iv 2 , iv 4 , iv 10 , iv 13 , iv 14 , iv 15 } being involved in the computation of u and v. The complexity would be very high if we directly try all possible combinations of the keys and IVs. However, with analysis on the expressions of u and v, we can reduce the search space from 2 96 to around 2 26.3 . Solve (5), (6) , (7) and (8), we obtain the following four groups of solutions:
Group 2.
Furthermore, from (2) we compute v as follows (note that the property 2
Let sum 1 = k 13 + 2 3 k 4 + 2 4 k 10 , sum 2 = iv 15 + 2 2 iv 13 + 2 5 iv 4 + 2 6 iv 10 . The value of sum 1 ranges from 0 to 6375, and the value of sum 2 ranges from 0 to 25755. We developed Algorithm 1 to search for weak keys.
Algorithm 1 Find weak keys for ∆iv 0
for (k15, iv2) in each of the 4 groups of solutions (9), (10), (11), (12) do for y = 0 to 127 do determine iv14 >> 1 and k0 for sum1 = 0 to 6375 do for iv0 = 0 to 255 do keySum ← 2 7 k15 + (2 23 + 1)k0 + 2 9 sum1 mod (2 For both IV and IV ′ , the identical keystreams are: 0xbfe800d5 0360a22b 6c4554c8 67f00672 2ce94f3f f94d12ba 11c382b3 cbaf4b31. . ..
Detecting weak keys for ∆iv 0
We have shown above that a random key is weak with probability 2 −15.4 . In the attack against ZUC, we will first detect a weak key, then recover it. To detect a weak key, our approach is to use the IV pairs generated from Algorithm 1 to test whether identical keystreams are generated. Note that for a particular value of sum 2 , we can always find a combination of (iv 4 , iv 10 , iv 13 , iv 15 } that satisfies sum 2 = iv 15 + 2 2 iv 13 + 2 5 iv 4 + 2 6 iv 10 . Thus a pair of IVs (iv 0 , iv 2 , iv 4 , iv 10 , iv 13 , iv 14 , iv 15 ) and (iv ′ 0 , iv 2 , iv 4 , iv 10 , iv 13 , iv 14 , iv 15 ) can be determined by each output of Algorithm 1. Using this result, we developed Algorithm 2 to detect weak keys for ∆iv 0 . In Algorithm 2, we need to test at most 2 13.3 pairs of IVs to determine if a key is weak for difference at iv 0 .
Recovering weak keys for ∆iv 0
After detecting a weak key, we proceed to recover the weak key. Once a key is detected as weak (as given from Algorithm 2), from the IV pair being used to generate identical keystreams, we immediately know the value of k 0 , k 15 and sum 1 . Note that sum 1 = (k 13 + 2 3 k 4 + 2 4 k 10 ). In the best situations, the sum is 0 or 25755, then we can uniquely determine k 4 , k 10 and k 13 . In the worst situation, there are 2 12 possible choices for k 4 , k 10 and k 13 , and therefore, we need 2 12 tests to determine the correct values for k 4 , k 10 and k 13 . On average, for each value of sum 1 , we need to test 2 11.4 combinations of (k 4 , k 10 , k 13 ). Since there are only five key bytes being recovered in our attack, the remaining 11 key bytes should be recovered with exhaustive search. Hence, the complexity to recover all key bits is 2 88 × 2 11.4 = 2 99. 4 . From the analysis above, we also know that the best complexity is 2 88 and the worst complexity is 2 100 .
Attack ZUC 1.4 with Difference at iv 1
In this section, we present the differential attack on ZUC 1.4 for IV difference at iv 1 . Different from the attack in Section 4, we need to consider the computation of u and v in the second step of the initialization. For this type of IV difference, for every key, there are some IV pairs that result in identical keystreams since more IV bytes are involved. Once we found such an IV pair, we can recover the key with complexity around 2 67 .
Identical keystreams for ∆iv 1
The computation of u and v in the second initialization step involves more key and IV bytes. The v in the second initialization step is computed as: 
And u is given as:
where f 1 and f 2 are some deterministic non-linear functions.
There are 10 IV bytes involved in the expression of v, i.e. (iv 0 , iv 1 , iv 2 , iv 4 , iv 5 , iv 10 , iv 11 , iv 13 , iv 14 , iv 15 ) and 8 IV bytes involved in the expression of u, i.e. (iv 0 , iv 3 , iv 4 , iv 7 , iv 10 , iv 11 , iv 13 , iv 15 ). In total, there are 12 IV bytes being involved in the computation of u and v, and every bit of u and v can be affected by IV. We conjecture that for every key, the conditions (5) and (6) can be satisfied, and identical keystreams can be generated. To verify it, we tested 1000 random keys. Our experimental results show that there is always an IV pair for each key that results in identical keystreams.
In the attack, a random key and a random iv pair with difference at iv 1 , the probability that v and u satisfy the conditions (5) and (6) Identical keystreams. We give below a key and an IV pair with difference at iv 1 that result in identical keystreams. The algorithm being used to find the IV pair is given in Appendix B. The algorithm is a bit complicated since a number of optimization tricks are involved. The explanation of the optimization details is omitted here since our focus is to develop a key recovery attack. The identical keystreams are: 0xf09cc17d 41f12d3f 453ac0c3 cadcef9f f98fb964 ca6e576e b48b813 6c43da22 . . ..
Key recovery for ∆iv 1
After identical keystreams are generated from an IV pair with difference at iv 1 , we proceed to recover the secret key. From Table 1 in Appendix A, we know the value of (v, v ′ ) since we know the difference at iv 1 of the chosen IV pair, and we also know the value of u since u = v or u = v ′ . In the following, we illustrate a key recovery attack after identical keystreams have been detected.
1. In the expression of u in (15) 15 , s 16H ), we try all the possible values of (k 11 , k 14 ) and check whether the value of v is correct or not. A random value of (k 11 , k 14 ) would pass the test with probability 2
Considering that there are 2 34 possible values of IVs in the attack. Note that the complexity in the first, second and third steps can be significantly reduced with optimization since we are dealing with simple functions. For example, meet-in-the-middle attack can be used in the first step, and the sum of a few key bytes can be considered in the second and third steps. However, the complexity of those three steps has little effect on the overall complexity of the attack, so we do not present the details of the optimization here.
Improving ZUC 1.4
From the analysis in Sect. 3, the weakness of the initialization comes from the non-injective update of the LFSR. To fix the flaw, we proposed the tweak in the rump session of Asiacrypt 2010. Instead of using the XOR operation, it is better to use addition modulo operation over GF (2 31 − 1). More specifically, the operation s 16 = v ⊕ u is changed to s 16 = v + u mod (2 31 − 1). With this tweak, the difference in v would always result in the difference in s 16 if there is no difference in u, and the attack against ZUC 1.4 can no longer be applied. In the later versions ZUC 1.5 and 1.6 (ZUC 1.5 and 1.6 have almost the same specifications), the computation of s 16 is modified using our suggested method.
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed two chosen IV attacks against the initialization of ZUC 1.4. In our attacks, identical keystreams are generated from different IVs, then key recovery attacks are applied. Our attacks are independent of the number of steps in initialization. The lesson from this paper is that when non-injective functions are used in cipher design, we should pay special attention to ensure that the difference cannot be eliminated with high probability. 1 Here we describe more details of an algorithm that is used to generate identical keystreams for the IV difference at iv 1 :
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